The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) for CMIP7

ScenarioMIP Scientific Steering Committee and Task Groups

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1. Introduction	4
1.1 CMIP and ScenarioMIP	4
1.2 Process of designing a new protocol for CMIP7	5
2. Overall design	6
2.1 General design principles	6
2.2 Other design criteria	9
2.3 In depth elaboration of specific scenarios	13
 Towards the design of the high- and medium emission scenarios for 0 15 	CMIP7
3.1 Introduction	15
3.2 Scenario Design of the high emission scenario	15
3.3 Scenario Design of the medium emission scenario	17
3.4 Scenario Design of the medium emission scenario	18
3.5 Summary	19
4 Towards the design of the low emission scenarios for CMIP7	20
4.1 Introduction	20
4.2. Design of the very low (VL) emission scenario	20
4.3 Design of the very low overshoot (LOS) scenario	23
4.4 Design of the low emissions scenario	25
4.5 Summary	25
5. Scenario extensions beyond 2100/2125	26
5.1a High scenario (H) - high priority	28
5.1b High overshoot scenario (HOS) – medium priority	28

5.2a Medium scenario (M) - low priority	28
5.2b Medium overshoot scenario (MOS) – medium priority	28
5.3 Low scenario (L) - low priority	29
5.4 Very low scenario (VL) – high priority	29
5.5 Very low with overshoot (LOS) - low priority	29
6. Representation of carbon dioxide removal	30
References	32
Appendix A: Acronyms	35

1 1. Introduction

2

3 1.1 CMIP and ScenarioMIP

4 Scenarios represent a critical tool in climate change analysis. They are used by different 5 research communities to explore potential future avenues in socio-economic conditions, assess the effects of different drivers of climate change, characterize future climatic conditions, and 6 7 assess impacts of climate change as well as adaptation and mitigation responses. Scenarios 8 also connect these research communities. In this paper, we are specifically concerned with 9 those scenarios that are used as external forcings to climate models, i.e. Earth System Models 10 (ESMs), General Circulation Models (GCMs), Climate Models of Intermediate or Reduced Complexity (CMICs) and Simple Climate Models (SCMs). These external forcings encompass 11 12 elements such as emissions and atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, chemically 13 reactive gases, and aerosols, and land use. Such scenarios play a pivotal role not only in 14 climate research but as integrating tools for scientific assessment processes and policy 15 analysis.

16 The Climate Modelling Intercomparison Project (CMIP) has been organising scenario 17 experiments for several phases. The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) 18 forms a primary activity within CMIP that facilitates multi-model climate projections based on 19 alternative plausible forcing scenarios that are directly relevant to societal concerns regarding 20 climate change mitigation, adaptation, and impacts. In this role, ScenarioMIP's goal is the 21 design of a limited set of scenario-based experiments, with three important aims:

- Service: Providing information about future changes in climate variables (such as temperature, precipitation, humidity, etc.) and related direct human forcings (such as population) to a diverse set of user communities that can be used for further research and analysis to better understand climate change, its impacts, risks, and response options, including mitigation choices. Such research communities include, for instance, researchers on impacts and vulnerability or real-world practitioners, who might use this information for national risk assessment or adaptation planning.
- Science: Providing information used to study and understand climate processes in and of themselves, and how their response to past and future anthropogenic forcings emerges from internal variability and model structural uncertainties.
- Policy: Providing information that helps support climate policy development and
 communication in line with national and international climate policy developments. This
 includes the use of ScenarioMIP outputs as part of forthcoming assessments of the
 IPCC. This means that the scenarios also need to comply with IPCC's mandate to
 provide policy relevant, but not prescriptive information.
- 37

38 Computational expenses associated with setting up, running and archiving output from climate

- 39 model experiments pose strict constraints on the number of scenarios that ScenarioMIP's
- 40 protocol can include. Therefore, a set of scenarios needs to be selected as a compromise that
- 41 satisfies these three critical goals as best as possible.
- 42

43 1.2 Process of designing a new protocol for CMIP7

44 On June 20-22, 2023, the first meeting of the ScenarioMIP project under the new phase of the

45 Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, CMIP7, was held in Reading, UK. During the

46 discussions in plenary and the various break-out sessions, a clear consensus on several main

- 47 characteristics of the scenario set emerged. Based on the meeting report, the Scientific
- 48 Steering Committee (SSC) of ScenarioMIP and several task groups have continued to work on
- an experimental design for the next round of ScenarioMIP. The results so far are captured inthis document.
- 51

52 The meeting also led to the installation of a final SSC for ScenarioMIP as well as a larger

- 53 advisory group (see https://wcrp-cmip.org/model-intercomparison-projects-mips/scenariomip/)
- 54 and a proposal on how to develop a new protocol for ScenarioMIP. At this point in time, the 55 envisioned pathway is as follows:
- First presentation of the ideas for ScenarioMIP and envisioned process by ScenarioMIP
 leadership (September 2023)
- Formulation of a draft proposal for a protocol based on the work of various task forces
 by ScenarioMIP Scientific Steering Committee (Late 2023)
- Review of the draft proposal by the ScenarioMIP advisory board (February 2024)
- External review of the draft proposal (April 2024)
- Further definition of exact characteristics of the scenarios (June-August 2024)
- Intended submission of the proposal to GMD (June-August 2024)
- Finalisation of the data and harmonisation with historical data (June-August 2025)
 - Start of climate model runs: Last quarter of 2025

65 66

The process will include a period in which the emission/land use scenarios can be tested inESMs for quality control.

69 2. Overall design

- 70
- 71

Box 2.1: Role of ScenarioMIP in CMIP6

72 In CMIP6. ScenarioMIP specified four Tier 1 and four Tier 2 scenarios to be run by 73 ESMs/GCMs, and these experiments (especially those in Tier 1) were run by most 74 modelling teams participating in CMIP6 and are by far the most used scenario-based 75 runs of CMIP6 (O'Neill et al., 2016; Tebaldi et al., 2021). The use of the ScenarioMIP 76 experiments resulted in physical science papers describing changes in climate 77 characteristics, but also a very large number of papers characterizing the impacts of 78 those changes. Further, ScenarioMIP results contributed to the assessment reports of 79 all Working Groups of IPCC, supplying a dimension of integration that is reflected in the 80 Synthesis Report of AR6 (IPCC 6th Assessment Report). The most direct use was in WGI, where ScenarioMIP runs formed the backbone of the assessment (IPCC, 2021). 81 The use in WGII was more limited because of issues related to timing (IPCC, 2022a). In 82 83 WGIII, ScenarioMIP results had an indirect but fundamental contribution via the 84 calibration of SCMs that allowed characterization of probabilistic global temperature 85 projections and the resulting classification of a large set of baseline and mitigation 86 scenarios produced by Integrated Assessment Models (IPCC, 2022b). There were some 87 issues related to the process. As under earlier phases, there were delays in data 88 production (by Integrated Assessment modeling teams), its translation into inputs for ESMs and its harmonisation to historical forcings. This also meant that data could not be 89 90 tested earlier, and for some ESM modeling teams this translated to significant time 91 before they were successfully able to run their models using the new forcing data fields. 92 Also, over time, critiques emerged about the plausibility of some scenarios (SSP5-8.5 93 and its precursor, RCP8.5; SSP1-1.9).

94

95 2.1 General design principles

96 In view of the multiple aims of the ScenarioMIP scenarios, the following general design

97 characteristics are proposed. Please note that these scenarios are not intended to

98 represent confined storylines, rather they are illustrative pathways.

99

100 Wide and plausible range

101 The scenarios should encompass a wide range of policy-relevant emission trajectories

102 considered to be plausible (i.e. not impossible for technical/geophysical reasons or for other

103 reasons beyond the range relevant for exploring various climate policy responses). This range,

104 however, could be smaller than assessed before. On the high-side, the plausibility of the CMIP6

high emissions levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have been questioned (Hausfather & Peters,

- 106 2020). On the low side, some emission trajectories in the period 2020-2030 have become
- 107 implausible or even impossible.
- 108

109 If possible, scenarios are to be run in emission-driven mode (for CO₂)

110 If possible, most simulations should be run in emission-driven mode – in contrast to the use of a

111 concentration-driven approach in CMIP6. A wider range of model outcomes for the same

- emission trajectory is expected, which may add further challenges to interpretation and
- 113 actionability of the results but will better represent the real uncertainty range as it would include

- both the uncertainty from the carbon cycle and from the climate system and have more direct
- relevance to the study of mitigation options. The runs would also be more consistent with
- 116 current ESM capabilities, especially regarding the outcomes of land-based mitigation solutions,
- 117 which are heavily dependent on feedbacks that are not represented in concentration-driven
- 118 experiments.
- 119
- 120 This will mean that all/most scenario runs are to be preferably emission-driven, (i.e., letting the
- 121 carbon-cycle in the ESM determine the concentration of CO_2 in the atmosphere that ensues
- from the prescribed emissions), but concentration data will also be provided for ESMs/GCMs
- that can only run in concentration mode (without an active carbon cycle) (some discussion on
 the capabilities of ESMs can be found here(Hajima et al., 2024) (Séférian et al., 2020). Here,
- 125 the proposal is for those ESMs/GCMs to run median estimates of the concentrations created by
- 126 SCMs (emulators) (see Box 2.2).
- 127
- Regarding CDR options, only reforestation will be based on endogenous representation of landbased mitigation solutions in ESM; for all other options we will include the emission impact in
 the IAM emission output (see Section 6). To better assess the impact of running in emission-
- driven mode over the range of responses ensuing from the multi-model ensemble, we also
- propose that models run one of the ScenarioMIP scenarios (M) both in emission-driven mode
- and in concentration-driven mode for comparison.
- 134

135 Box 2.2: Concentration-driven runs 136 Several climate models may choose not to run in emission-driven mode. It is proposed to therefore provide median values of the expected concentration outcomes (using 137 simple climate models (=emulators) calibrated on CMIP6 results to simulate the carbon 138 139 cycle) for all ScenarioMIP scenarios. It is expected that within the total set of model results, the concentration-driven models will have a reduced outcome space compared 140 141 to the emission driven set - which will have consequences for interpretation and use of 142 certain variables. An alternative could have been to run concentration-driven models 143 multiple times using low/medium/high estimates of the concentrations, derived by alternative values of the parameters affecting carbon cycle uncertainty. However, this 144 145 would complicate and burden the ScenarioMIP design excessively. It is recognized that this type of exploration would be an important contribution to the uncertainty 146 147 quantification of model projections, and we suggest that it should be the object of a 148 research project.

149

150 While we encourage the research and modeling community to experiment with full emission 151 driven runs, it is proposed that under the ScenarioMIP protocol models be run in emission-

- driven runs, it is proposed that under the ScenarioMIP protocol models be run in emissiondriven mode for CO₂ only and not for all GHGs as it is expected that choosing the latter would
- 153 significantly reduce the number of models participating in emission-driven mode and too little
- experience has been built up with such runs (the final protocol will be decided after surveying
- the modelling teams). The use of concentration-driven data for non-CO₂ GHGs and air
- 156 pollutants requires running a preliminary step using a limited set of models with full
- 157 representation of air chemistry to create the concentration data. This could include the use of
- 158 emulators and an atmospheric chemistry model. While the proposal is to use one consistent
- 159 method for all scenarios in ScenarioMIP, it might be interesting to research the relevant

160 uncertainty by adding more atmospheric chemistry models and even use the output as forcing

- 161 for ESMs (e.g. in AerChemMIP or in research projects).
- 162
- 163 Scenarios
- 164 The consensus from the Reading meeting formed around a set of 6 scenarios.
- High emission scenario: There was an interest in a high emission scenario based on assuming developments in an adverse direction, including, e.g., high demographic growth and slow technology development. This high emission scenario is, however, expected to result in forcings below SSP5-8.5. (See Section 3)
- Medium emission scenario: There was an interest in a middle scenario to explore consequences of continuing current policies without modification. (See Section 3)
- Overshoot. Strong interest was also expressed for an additional scenario that would
 follow the medium scenario until mid-century, with rapidly decreasing emissions
 afterwards, representing delayed mitigation action. (See Section 3)
- 174 • Low emission scenarios: There was an interest in a set of scenarios at the low end that 175 would inform policies consistent with the Paris Agreement (i.e. the range from 1.5 to 176 below 2°C). One of the scenarios should remain as low as possible given feasibility 177 constraints (consistent with a majority of the participants indicating that ScenarioMIP 178 should only prescribe plausible scenarios, leaving idealized/counterfactual pathways to 179 different research exercises or MIPs). This scenario is thus relevant for the low end of the 180 Paris range (i.e. as close to the 1.5°C goal as possible). The second trajectory would be 181 a scenario with an overshoot of the 1.5°C goal, followed by a deployment of Carbon 182 Dioxide Removal (CDR) intended to return to lower levels, thus supporting research into 183 the reversibility of climate outcomes and their impacts. The last scenario would be 184 consistent with the pursuit of warming levels below 2°C. (See Section 4)
- 185
- 186

187 Figure 2.1 shows a stylized, qualitative design for the CMIP7 ScenarioMIP scenarios as

188 discussed and agreed upon in Reading



189

Figure 2.1: Draft outline scenarios developed on final day of work at the Reading meeting (the lines are only meant as illustration, e.g., decisions on timing still need to be taken). The dashed line was at the time

192 of the Reading meeting considered as a possible additional scenario to the set of five, but received strong

193 endorsement in the intervening time since that discussion, by the SSC and the Advisory Group.

194

195 2.2 Other design criteria

196 Scenario period

197 The scenario period starts in 2025 (for CMIP7, historical forcings will be finalized up to the end of 2024). There are important reasons to investigate long-term dynamics beyond the end of the 198 199 century, and therefore the need for extensions was voiced. But first, a survey of the Integrated 200 Assessment Modeling teams is planned to determine whether their output could cover the 201 period up to 2125 in recognition that the traditional 2100 horizon is naturally becoming 202 increasingly shorter. In any case, long-term extensions (assumed not to be reliant on Shared 203 Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) drivers and Integrated Assessment modelling) would start 204 from the end of the Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) scenario output (2100 or 2125) and 205 cover the period out to 2200 or, preferably, 2300 (See Section 5). Particular interest in the 206 longer term was expressed by the icesheet/sea level rise researchers.

207

208 Air pollution control

- 209 Decisions need to be made on air pollution control (Short Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs),
- 210 among which aerosols from sulfur emissions -- are particularly critical because of their cooling
- 211 effect). The high scenario is a logical candidate for high sulfur emissions, partly because of a
- strong correlation between GHG mitigation policy effects and air quality outcomes (i.e., air
- 213 pollutant emissions are expected to be low in stringent GHG mitigation cases). However, high
- aerosol emissions in the high scenario would also slow down warming. Therefore, the proposal

- 215 is to have a high scenario with the expected decrease (because of historical trends in
- 216 implementation of air quality controls on pace with economic development) in aerosol emissions
- 217 (i.e., using standard emission factors) and have a variant of it with deliberately high aerosol
- 218 emissions (based on higher emission factors) in AerChemMIP.
- 219
- 220 Ensembles

221 Decisions need to be made on the use/size of initial condition ensembles. These are particularly 222 relevant at the low end of the scenario range where the emergence of a climate signal is 223 expected to require relatively larger ensembles but are also important to enable sampling of 224 longer return period events (rarer events) at all levels of forcing. Under CMIP6, teams were 225 asked to run each scenario at least once -and to run an initial condition ensemble of at least 10 226 members for a specific scenario (SSP3-7.0). For CMIP7, we request running ensembles (e.g. 3 227 members, or more according to modeling centers capacities) for each scenario, which will help 228 to reduce uncertainty. The Strategic Ensemble Design Task Team may be asked for further 229 advice. It is still an open question if climate model emulators could be used to complement this 230 part of the design. Emulators have not been adequately trained and tested for peak and decline 231 scenarios, and it is still unclear whether any emulator would be able to fully replace the

- 232 comprehensive set of outputs from an ESM.
- 233

234 IAM model runs

Based on the - mostly qualitative - formulation of the different scenarios in this document, it is
envisioned to ask the IAM community to provide alternative (i.e., ideally more than one)
quantitative interpretations of the scenarios. Subsequently, marker scenarios could be selected
for ScenarioMIP (realizing also the possible impacts on the climate outcomes). The full set of
alternative scenarios can still provide flexibility for users other than ScenarioMIP models (e.g.
scenario analysts), certainly if key parameters are varied (such as CDR use). The alternative
scenarios could also include variants with and without climate change impacts. Decisions will

- also need to be made regarding the choice of underlying SSPs.
- 243

The IAM community will be asked to explore different scenarios as pilots until the June-August 245 2024 time frame and after that start making further decisions on the exact characteristics. The 246 Scenario working group of IAMC will be the conduit through which the plan and its timeline will 247 be vetted and finalized.

248

The expectation is that the CMIP results will be used in IPCC assessments finalised in 2028.

- This means that studies will be published in the 2026-2027 time frame while the scenarios need to be useful to policy discussions in the subsequent years. It is therefore proposed that the
- 252 scenarios do not diverge before 2025 (and implement expected developments up to 2025
- based on current implemented policies). For the period up to 2027, it is also expected that
- differences would remain within a relatively narrow plausibility range.
- 255
- 256

257	Box 2.3: Different mitigation strategies
258	Mitigation strategies can differ in choice of reduction measures, timing, geographic
259	location and underlying baseline (SSPs). For instance, climate impacts can be different
260	for negative emissions originating from bio-energy-and-carbon-capture-and-
261	sequestration (CCS) or reforestation. The same can be the case for a SSP1 or SSP3
262	based scenario staying well below 1.5 °C. Mitigation action can also differ in terms of
263	the contribution of various sectors and countries, strongly related to justice issues. The
264	latter will also be further explored in IAM research – summarized in subsequent IPCC
265	WGIII reports. In ScenarioMIP, the focus is on the climate response of different forcing
266	trajectories. It will be interesting to further research whether differences in mitigation
267	strategies lead to clearly identifiable physical responses in climate model runs. This
268	can also inform the exchangeability of climate model runs for different impact studies. It
269	should be noted that solar radiation management is not included in these experiments
270	as it is covered in a separate MIP (GeoMIP).

271

272 Impacts and adaptation

273 The proposal will request the IAM teams to produce simulations that do not include climate

change impacts on anthropogenic systems (e.g. agriculture, energy use or economic growth). At

this point of time, there are several pragmatic reasons for this. First, the scenarios are also used

to estimate impacts by impact models (combination of climate and direct human drivers) –

leading to possible double counting. Moreover, not all IAM can represent the breadth and detailof many regional impacted systems and adaptation strategies. The scenarios are therefore

of many regional impacted systems and adaptation strategies. The scenarios are therefore intended to be augmented by impacts and adaptation studies that complete the picture of

potential future worlds with climate shifts, mitigation, adaptation, and development. At the same

time, demand for fully consistent scenarios is growing. It is, therefore, encouraged that IAM

models produce additional scenarios in which impacts are accounted for. This work may also

- 283 lead to different scenario protocols for future ScenarioMIP exercises.
- 284

285 *Modeling assumptions*

The modeling paradigms and assumptions underlying IAM implementations relate to questions of mitigation preferences and climate justice. Exploring the implications of these assumptions, and alternative implementations, is of critical importance to provide policy relevant science to inform the deliberations on mitigation efforts and their regional distribution. These important questions, however, are outside the scope of ScenarioMIP that is focussed on providing scenario forcing data for ESMs. The use of IAMs within ScenarioMIP is limited to provide

292 emissions and land use forcing time series that allow to explore different global climate futures

- in a policy neutral way. An exploration of alternative implementations of the ScenarioMIP
- scenario narratives using different modeling paradigms and normative assumptions is explicitlyencouraged.
- 296

297 The role of complex climate models vs emulators

298 Some further discussion is needed on the role of different tools (especially ESMs vs emulators

of climate model output). The use of emulators can be attractive both to fill in gaps in the design

300 and to accelerate some of the outcomes of new scenarios, given the unavoidable time

301 constraints. Thus, it is useful to consider how emulator use can further reduce the

302 computational load on climate models for scenario exercises and the expectation is that, given

- 303 the rapid developments in the emulation space of the last few years, the use of emulators to
- 304 fully substitute for ESM output may become better actionable in a not-so-distant future. As of
- now, however, no emulator can address the provision of outputs from an ESM in their entirety
- 306 and for all types of scenarios (with overshoot/peak-and-decline constituting particularly open
- 307 questions given the scarcity of existing scenario simulations having these characteristics, on
- 308 which emulators could be trained). At this point in time, therefore, it is envisioned that all
- 309 scenarios will be run using ESMs.
- 310
- 311 Input variables for ScenarioMIP model runs
- 312 Input data for ScenarioMIP model runs needs to be made available both for climate models and 313 for the Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability research community. Decisions will also need to
- be made regarding the forcings/additional data that will be provided. Table 2.1 illustrates what
- type of data could be made available, but it is proposed that ScenarioMIP requests the CMIP
- 316 panel (and, via the panel, the modeling teams) as well as the Vulnerability Impacts Adaptation
 317 and Climate Services (VIACS) advisory heard to CMIP to provide further guidance
- and Climate Services (VIACS) advisory board to CMIP to provide further guidance.
- 318

	Climate models	Vulnerability, Impact and adaptation community	
Based on previous round	CO ₂ emissions (fossil + land use) + concentrations (harmonised with historical data) Land use change (harmonised with historical data) CH4, N2O, CO, NOx, H2, VOC, SO2 emission data (harmonised with historical data and run via an atmospheric chemistry model)	Population maps Energy system parameters Land use maps/crop data (in addition to land cover) Water consumption and irrigation [gridded]	
Additional data	Data on CDR activity (reforestation; negative emissions)	Urban area Economic variability and poverty/inequality	
	Water consumption [gridded] Fertiliser use Crop yields Gridded energy consumption Other	Fertiliser use Crop yields Gridded energy consumption	

319 Table 2.1: Possible input data into ScenarioMIP (further input requested)

320

321 Further, the CMIP7 Forcings Task Team is in place to address some of these issues (required

forcing input files, harmonization) and coordinate the provision of ESM forcings through the

input4mip effort. This include, for instance, also harmonization of historical emission data and

324 providing consistent gridded land use data. For this, ScenarioMIP will work closely together with

325 the Forcing Task Team.

326 Output variables from ESMs

An inquiry will be sent to relevant actors for required output data, in cooperation with the CMIP7 data request team (data request is being sent out through a series of papers). In this context it might be useful to also evaluate the previous set of output data (including possibly the download records). Many variables were produced from the last set of scenario runs but a smaller number were broadly used. The data collected in other areas could go beyond the CMIP6 set, including for instance atmospheric composition and chemistry and data on extreme events.

333

334 Consistency with earlier scenario sets

335 In CMIP6, one of the scenario design's stated goals was to facilitate comparison with CMIP5 336 and some studies were published that attributed changes in temperature range to changes in 337 scenarios vs models. It is assumed, however, that for the study of consistencies and differences 338 from model development, the experiments prescribed as part of CMIP's Diagnostics, Evaluation 339 and Characterization of Klima (DECK) is more suitable. ScenarioMIP will contact the CMIP 340 panel to ask for their opinion on the suitability of the DECK runs for consistency checks. In the 341 final design, it would be useful to consider how to further improve consistency (e.g., scenarios 342 could end up - when run by simple climate models - at similar forcing or warming levels to

- 343 previous scenarios).
- 344

345

346 2.3 In depth elaboration of specific scenarios

In the rest of the document, we will further explore ideas and considerations relevant to the
various scenarios. This is based on the results of discussions undertaken by the SSC since
Reading, and research within four task groups that were formed after Reading to address open
questions with regard to:

- 351 1. High and medium emission scenarios
- 352 2. Low emission scenarios
- 353 3. Extensions
- 4. Representation of negative emissions in IAMs and ESMs
- 355
- 250
- 356
- 357 'Table 2.2: Scenarios and proposed naming
- 358

Scenario group	Scenario name	Brief description	Priority
High/Medium	High (H)	High emission scenario to explore possible high end impacts	1
	Medium (M)	Medium emission scenario consistent with current policies	1

2 °C	Medium Overshoot (MO)	Scenario follows medium scenario and mid-century diverts rapidly leading to an overshoot of 2 °C	1
Low scenarios	Low (L)	Scenario consistent with staying with high probability below 2 °C	1
	Very Low (VL)	Scenario consistent with limited overshoot of 1.5 °C (as low as possible)	1
	Low Overshoot (LOS)	Scenario with similar end-of-century impact to VL, but with overshoot	1
Concentration- driven	HIgh, Concentration driven (MC)	Variant of H, concentration-driven for models that also run the emission-driven variant	2
	Medium, Concentration driven (MC)	Variant of M, concentration-driven for models that also run the emission-driven variant	1
	Low-concentration driven (LC)	Variant of L, concentration-driven for models that also run the emission-driven variant	2

362 3. Towards the design of the high- and medium 363 emission scenarios for CMIP7

364

365 3.1 Introduction

The high and medium scenarios (H&M) are interesting to study possible impacts, challenges to adaptation and mitigation as well as climate dynamics. Below, we discuss the main scenario characteristics and narratives.

369

370 3.2 Scenario Design of the high emission scenario

The high-emission scenario explores a plausible future world that weakens or even abandons mitigation policies and actions. It is important for addressing questions such as: what are the physical, socio-economic, and ecological impacts associated with a scenario in which climate policy largely fails? What is the risk of reaching possible tipping points in the Earth system over a wide range of future warming levels? How large might the climate change risks be to which society will have to adapt? Do non-linear responses alter the nature of extreme events as the world reaches higher warming levels? How far beyond current conditions are known

adaptations viable? How much might mitigation policies reduce risks relative to a future withhigh warming?

380 The scenario includes events and outcomes that may not be likely given current trends but are

381 still plausible enough to occur. The world view it represents is consistent with policy roll-back,

the lack of coordination and cooperation for addressing global environmental concerns,

societies and industries depending on and even reverting to fossil fuel resources, the adoption
 of resource and energy intensive production technologies and lifestyles, and unforeseen

385 technological barriers. This scenario is not meant to represent a "business-as-usual" or no-

- 386 policy reference scenario for the other cases. The scenario is intended to explore the upper end
- of GHG emissions resulting from deep political, technological and structural deviation fromcurrent trends.

389 In this scenario, the rapid cost decrease in renewable energy of the past decade is followed by 390 a period of slowdown of cost declines, as a result of regional scarcity and limited tradability in 391 materials for solar, wind technologies and EV batteries (IEA, 2021; Schlichenmaier & Naegler, 392 2022) as well as lack of public support and the remaining strong position of fossil fuel industries. 393 Critical mineral mining projects may lead to price spikes, local opposition and investment risks, 394 hampering the global energy transition. Such a situation might be combined with the SSP5 or 395 SSP3 scenario (in the SSP5 scenario it might be at odds with relatively high technology 396 development (O'Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017) but possibly consistent with the rapid 397 economic growth and energy intensive lifestyles; in SSP3 the lack of international collaboration 398 and generally stagnating technological progress might be consistent with the scenario).

Since the emission outcomes of the pathways will not be fully known until run by IAMs, we
recommend that IAM modeling teams develop two storylines, using both SSP3 and SSP5
baselines updated with recent data and trends, and then select a preferred, plausible high-

- 402 emission scenario. Further specification of the scenario protocol may happen in parallel with the
- 403 IAM test runs. We note also that according to the scenario framework design, climate impacts
- 404 are not included in the scenarios produced for ScenarioMIP, to avoid double counting of
- 405 impacts in IAV studies. If climate impacts were large enough to modify global emissions and
- 406 land use trajectories, a possibility especially in a high scenario, this would introduce an
- 407 inconsistency in the scenario.
- An additional issue is the treatment of fossil fuel reserves and resources and their tradeability. The cumulative amount of fossil fuel use is likely to be considerably larger than the estimated total reserves (these are known deposits that are extractable at current prices and technologies) (Bauer et al., 2015; Rogner, 1997). Future technologies or market prices would make current resources (estimates of undiscovered and/or not recoverable at current prices) recoverable to some extent. The IAM models already include decision criteria about the use of such energy resources⁴. How these play out in the two different scenarios needs to be transparent.
- 415

In support of the plausibility of a high emission scenario it is crucial to document and motivate the techno-economic, political and socioeconomic assumptions that drive the transformation. Over the past decade several developments and trends have diverted the transformation pathway away from very high-emission levels. In particular, progress in the fields of renewable energy technologies and electrification of end-uses have substantially eroded the competitive advantages of fossil fueled technologies. Therefore, the causes and drivers that lead towards fossil fuel-based development need to be clarified and motivated.

fossil fuel-based development need to be clarified and motivated.

423 Another key factor is aerosol forcing. Aerosol emissions have been observed to shape regional 424 climate and will be one of the major drivers to influence climate change in coming decades 425 (Persad et al., 2022). Aerosols will be included in all SSP scenarios and sensitivity to aerosols 426 will be tested for the high scenario. Following the SSP storylines, the recommendation might be 427 to use low aerosol levels for SSP5 and high for SSP3. However, using high aerosols would lead 428 to less warming and also a different ratio between warming and precipitation, which might be 429 less useful for impact assessment (Shiogama et al., 2023). Therefore, we propose to use 430 default or low aerosol levels in the high scenario, an assumption also supported by the potential 431 for air pollution control in developing countries (e.g. as currently happening in China). A high 432 aerosol variant could be run in AerChemMIP and RAMIP (Wilcox et al., 2023).

- To maintain plausibility of the scenario and keep consistency in the near term with other scenarios, we recommend considering a high-emission situation that takes account of the benefits of existing emission reductions through 2025 and deviates thereafter. The near-term developments would be constrained to be consistent with the overall scenario set, i.e. implement expected developments until 2025 with rapid roll-back of climate policy after 2026. The narrative storylines of the high scenario would follow the original storylines of the driving SSPs. How policy roll-back could come about in both scenarios are as follows:
- In SSP3, a resurgent nationalism, concerns about competitiveness and security, and
 regional conflicts push countries to increasingly focus on domestic or regional issues.

- Policies shift to become increasingly oriented toward national and regional security
 issues, including barriers to trade. A low international priority for addressing climate
 concerns leads to collapse of international and national climate policies.
- In SSP5, there is little effort to avoid global environmental concerns due to a perceived tradeoffs with progress on economic development while local environmental impacts (e.g. aerosols related to air pollutant emissions) are addressed effectively by technological solutions. Technological progress and investments focus on fossil fuels while low investment in low-carbon technologies leads to relatively high barriers to development and dissemination in renewables and other low-carbon technologies. The strong reliance on fossil fuels and the lack of global environmental concern leads to
- 452 ineffectiveness of international and national climate policies.
- 453 Extreme events in many forms such as climate and other environmental, social, geopolitical,
- financial or economic shocks can happen in the short-term whereas some drivers or outcomes
- of the extremes may happen over longer periods of time⁵. Extremes may act to push the
- 456 emission pathway upward. However, not all feedbacks are included in IAMs; social
- 457 fragmentation, energy insecurity, or policy breakdown are theoretically possible in the high-end458 storylines.

459 3.3 Scenario Design of the medium emission scenario

460 The medium-emission scenario is a benchmark that shows the consequences of some measure 461 of the current policy situation continuing over the century, and we refer to this as a "current or 462 frozen policy scenario". It should not be considered as a "most likely" scenario. The scenario will 463 be used to explore a future world in the case of continuing currently implemented climate 464 policies and/or emission pledges and can be used to address questions such as: what future 465 physical, socio-economic, and ecological risks are implied by current levels of climate change 466 policy (Roelfsema et al., 2020; Rogelj et al., 2023)? In comparison to lower scenarios, what are 467 the relative benefits and costs of taking further mitigation actions? What are the needs for 468 adaptation implied by current policy levels? What limits to adaptation would be encountered in 469 future decades without additional mitigation actions?

- 470 To distinguish between the medium scenario and the lower mitigation scenarios, we make an 471 assumption that mitigation actions in a medium scenario must be established in policy with 472 some legislation to back them up, and ideally a plan for implementation. We don't include 473 announcements of future policy goals which come with no current basis in policy. We 474 recommend using the existing policies because including either Nationally Determined 475 Contributions (NDCs) pledges or net zero announcements involves making significant 476 judgements on implementation. Furthermore, taking only the existing policies appears most 477 consistent with the concept of the "frozen policy" approach. This still leaves a range of possible 478 options based on the literature and ambiguity of interpreting current policies (Rogelj et al., 479 2023).
- We consider several options for the treatment of policy assumptions that have a bearing onemissions over time for the medium scenario. In the IAM community already several rules are
- 482 used to extend current policies beyond 2030 (van Soest et al., 2021). There are various

alternatives in terms of specific policies of countries, but the progression of policies in the real
world is clearly unknown. This could argue for an assumption of no progression in mitigation
policy beyond 2050. Giving the medium scenario this idealized aspect also helps to reinforce

486 the point that it is not a "most likely" scenario.

487 Another complexity is whether to focus only on national policies, or to include corporate

- 488 pledges, which is consistent with the need for public, private and citizen responses to the
- 489 climate challenge. In the recommendation for initial scenarios for earth system model
- simulations we take the pragmatic choice of focusing on national policies but recommend
- further work on the sensitivity of current policy outcomes to a broader interpretation of emission
- 492 reduction pledges.

493 We recommend that the underlying storyline continues to use a middle of the road SSP2 case, 494 updated for CMIP7. Emission policy choices are frozen at present day (taken as the latest time 495 that still allows the IAM and then earth system models to be run in time to inform the global 496 stocktake). Non-climate-related environmental policies (e.g. forest protection, air pollution) are 497 still allowed to improve within the scenario. In addition, underlying technology assumptions are 498 allowed to evolve and the sensitivity of results to these assumptions should be assessed. A 499 pragmatic choice is for IAM modelers to agree on a single definition of current policies to freeze, 500 and then to implement this in the different IAMs. The scenario to then take forward into CMIP7 501 would come from the median climate outcome from this range. As a starting point we 502 recommend using an updated version of the reasoning from the "CurPol" scenario assumptions 503 used in Working Group III of IPCC AR6 (IPCC, 2022b). The frozen policy scenario provides a 504 benchmark against which additional future mitigation policies can be assessed.

505 For consideration in the longer term, we would recommend exploration of the climate response 506 for alternative IAM responses to the current policy assumptions above, and potentially a wider 507 consideration of other interpretations of current policy, including alternative views on policies 508 around air quality.

509 3.4 Scenario Design of the medium emission scenario

510 The last scenario (see Figure 2.1) follows the medium scenario until mid-century and 511 subsequently starts to implement rapid and deep action to reduce emissions. The scenario 512 correspond to a lack of policy action in the next decades. The scenario fills the gap between the 513 medium scenario and the low scenarios and represents a moderate action interpretation of the 514 world that fails to implement the Paris Agreement. The scenario will lead to a peak in 515 temperature followed by a decline after emissions reach net zero. The exact form of this 516 overshoot scenario will be further explored as part of the model experiments also looking at the 517 other scenarios. In principle, design criteria are similar to the very-low-overshoot scenario 518 discussed in the next chapter, i.e. following the medium scenario, followed by rapid but feasible 519 climate action leading to negative emissions – but limited by sustainability constraints.

520

521 3.5 Summary

522 IAM teams are requested to produce scenarios with the characteristics as indicated in Table523 3.1.

524

525 Table 3.1: Main characteristics of the scenarios

	Description
Η	Scenario that explores roll-back of existing climate policy; low technology development on renewables and thus high emissions (SSP3/SSP5 based)
М	Scenario that explores emission trajectory consistent with current policies (SSP2 based)
MOS	Scenario that deviates from the medium (M) scenario mid-century – followed by rapid and deep climate action.

527 4 Towards the design of the low emission scenarios for CMIP7

528

529 4.1 Introduction

530 The ScenarioMIP meeting in Reading concluded that on the low side of the temperature 531 spectrum three scenarios should be analyzed (L, VL, LOS). These scenarios would broadly fall 532 into the range of scenarios that have been associated with the Paris climate goals in the 533 literature. We explicitly take no position on Paris-consistency of the low emission scenarios in 534 this protocol. Instead, we broadly define them in terms of expected global temperature 535 outcomes. In doing so, we acknowledge that associated global temperature projections will not 536 be known before ESMs have run the emissions scenarios as part of scenarioMIP. The 537 temperature response will ultimately depend on carbon cycle feedbacks and climate sensitivity 538 as represented by the ESMs. However, expectations about potential temperature outcomes can 539 be formulated based on existing knowledge informing simple climate models (SCMs) and 540 carbon budget estimates in combination with deep reductions in non-CO₂ emissions. IAM teams 541 should take these expectations as guidance to design their emissions modelling for the low 542 scenarios. 543

The low scenarios include 1) a scenario that limits warming to below 1.5°C median warming by 2100 with a temporary overshoot that is as low as can still be plausible, 2) a scenario with higher overshoot at peak warming that attempts to return to below 1.5°C median warming by 2100, and 3) a scenario which remains likely below 2°C throughout the 21st century. It is actually a research question of ScenarioMIP how the updated emission projections can be

- 549 categorized in terms of the categories used by IPCC WGIII in 2022 (IPCC, 2022b)¹.
- 550

4.2. Design of the very low (VL) emission scenario

552 General considerations

553 The lowest emission pathway among the ScenarioMIP pathways should be designed such that 554 the resulting temperature outcomes at the time of peak warming are as low as can still be 555 plausibly achieved. We define plausibility as (1) within geophysical and techno-economic 556 feasibility limits, particularly regarding ramp-up rates of mitigation and CDR technologies, and 557 (2) accounting for technology and policy trends / constraints in the short-run (see below for a

¹ According to AR6 WG3 Annex III Table 14: C1: Limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Reach or exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century with a likelihood of ≤67%, and limit warming to 1.5°C in 2100 with a likelihood >50%. Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C by up to about 0.1°C and for up to several decades). C2: Return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot (Exceed warming of 1.5°C during the 21st century with a likelihood of >67%, and limit warming to 1.5°C in 2100 with a likelihood of >50%. Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C by up to about 0.1°C and for up to several decades). C2: Return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot (Exceed warming of 1.5°C during the 21st century with a likelihood of >67%, and limit warming to 1.5°C in 2100 with a likelihood of >50%. High overshoot refers to temporarily exceeding 1.5°C global warming by 0.1°C- 0.3°C for up to several decades). C3: Limit warming to 2°C (>67%) Limit peak warming to 2°C throughout the 21st century with a likelihood of >67%.

detailed description of assumptions for the period until 2030). In ScenarioMIP, scenarios will
preferably be run in emission driven mode. This means that in the design phase, it will not be
(fully) known what concentration or temperature level the set of Earth system models (ESMs)
will reach at their peak, at the end of the century, or afterwards (initial assessments will be
computed in the IAMs by climate emulators). Concentration and temperature levels are also

- 563 conditional on the effectiveness of those CDR measures which are implemented in the ESMs
- 564 (likely a subset of the CDR measures represented in IAMs in CMIP7).
- 565 Critical design elements of the very low scenario are reducing CO₂ emissions rapidly and 566 deeply, reaching net zero CO_2 emissions between 2045-2060, while also reducing the non- CO_2 567 emissions deeply. Aerosol emissions are determined by associated changes in energy and land 568 use and assumptions about air pollution control policies. IAM teams should make ambitious 569 assumptions about air pollution controls in line with sustainable development objectives. After 570 the point of net zero CO₂ emissions, the pathway will be designed to transition to sustained net 571 negative CO₂ emissions in order to increase the likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5°C in the 572 second half of the century (initial assessments will be computed by climate emulators). This 573 should entail reaching net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the 21st century. The 574 scenario should also consider other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including 575 protecting biodiversity and reducing global inequalities, to the extent feasible.IAM teams should 576 explore measures that minimize the trade-offs and exploit synergies (e.g. dietary change for 577 land use) when designing the emission scenarios.

578 In order to achieve these outcomes, the very low scenario should consider a range of 579 measures and underlying trends that would permit rapid emissions reductions based on 580 plausible assumptions about the underlying pace of the system transformations (see e.g. 581 Brutschin et al., 2021) general characteristics of low-carbon technology innovation (Malhotra & 582 Schmidt, 2020; Wilson et al., 2020) and the dynamics of socio-technical innovation (Jewell & 583 Cherp, 2023). Achieving this low pathway is also strongly linked to sustainable land futures, 584 including shifts towards low greenhouse gas emitting diets (e.g. the Lancet Planetary diet) 585 (Humpenöder et al., 2024). There could be clear differences between the lowest scenario and 586 the overshoot scenario, for instance in their long-term CDR use and near-term land-use.

587 The IAM modeling teams will be asked to develop an ensemble of scenarios, representing 588 alternative interpretations of each of the three low-emission ScenarioMIP scenarios (see also 589 further in this document). Specifically for the lowest scenario, it is important to avoid assuming 590 implausible reductions in the very near term. Modeling teams should constrain (very) near term 591 developments in the scenarios as follows:

- Until 2025: match historic trends until 2023 and implement expected developments for
 2024 and 2025 based on current trends. This holds for emissions and technology
 deployments (see also overall design).
- From 2025 to 2030: IAM teams are asked to make their own judgment of as low as
 plausible mediating between (1) feasibility limits and (2) plausibility considerations given
 broad technology and policy trends / constraints, as well as (3) stated policy objectives
 (including commitments beyond NDCs such as the Renewable Energy and Energy

- 599 Efficiency pledge, the deforestation pledge, the Global Methane Pledge, etc.) up to 600 2030. Too strong reductions lead to non-actionable counterfactuals: the scenarios 601 should still be policy-relevant in 2028. This means estimates are needed up to 2030 of 602 somewhat likely trends.
- After 2030, mitigation trends should be framed in terms of reaching the long-term climate
 target. This ambition is bounded by considerations of techno-economic feasibility of low
 carbon technology deployment and where relevant sustainable development goals (see
 above).

For the development of the lowest plausible emissions trajectories, it is recommended that the modeling teams consider a wide portfolio of options but also explore different options that would enable rapid transitions towards low GHG emissions. The following design elements were identified (the list is non-exhaustive and can be amended by the modeling teams). These design elements broadly cover complementary levers (groups of measures) that are available to reduce emissions:

- reduction in final energy demand
- rapid decarbonization of electricity supply (as measured by carbon intensity of electricity
 based on gross CO₂ emissions)
- deep electrification of industry, transport and buildings
- deep decarbonization of residual non-electric fuel mix in industry, transport and buildings
- widespread behavioral changes in diet, transportation and consumption
- deep reduction of industrial process emissions, including also reducing Fluorinated
 greenhouse gases in line with Kigali amendment
 - deep reduction of non-CO₂ gases, in particular methane
- elimination of net CO₂ emissions from land use and rapid deployment of land-based
 CDR measures (within sustainability limits) to move to net negative Agriculture, Forestry
 and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) CO₂ emissions in the medium to long term
 - deployment of CDR measures with geological storage, or storage in materials, within sustainability limits
- 628 Some of these levers (alternative fuels, AFOLU) may have implications for SLCF emissions and 629 air pollution.
- An important question that the lowest Scenario MIP scenario would address is how strongly
- 632 peak warming can still be constrained given the lack of emissions reductions thus far. The
- 633 overshoot of 1.5 °C in the very low scenario should be limited to the lowest level plausible as
- 634 defined above.

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- A number of particularly relevant scenario dimensions for Earth System Models (ESMs) were identified: 1) Land use and afforestation policy, 2) Land- and Ocean-based CDR strategies, 3) Regionally defined emissions, for greenhouse gases and aerosols, 4) resolved biofuel growth, transport, consumption and CCS, 5) treatment of carbon storage reservoirs and assumptions on loss rates, 6) regionally defined renewable energy production. An explicit representation of these dimensions in the IAM scenarios would thus help representation of the pathways by
- 641 ESMs and permit improved linkages among IAMs and ESMs.

643 4.3 Design of the very low overshoot (LOS) scenario

644 Global greenhouse gas emissions are not declining and continue to follow a near-constant 645 trend. Looking into scenarios with overshoot of the low-end goals of the Paris Agreement are 646 thus an important point of comparison to the very low emissions scenario discussed above. 647 648 Design of overshoot scenarios may be undertaken with different priorities in mind and the 649 ultimate design should account for these different considerations: . 650 Analyzing the geophysical and technological uncertainties. This will result in a better 651 understanding of the viability of achieving climate overshoot in the first place, exploiting 652 (limited) process resolution of emissions-driven ESMs. This includes identifying 653 hysteresis in the climate system - both globally (e.g., through simulations of Zero 654 Emissions Commitment scenarios) and regionally. 655 Assessing the impacts of temperature overshoot, and the benefits of avoided overshoot. -656 Gaining a better understanding of the near- and long-term consequences of delaying 657 emission reductions. This will help inform ongoing policy discussions around plausibility 658 and implications of overshoot resulting from delayed actions. 659 -Understanding the benefits, costs, and trade-offs of achieving declining temperatures in 660 the long term. 661 662 Given these considerations, the overshoot scenario proposed is an attempted high-overshoot in 663 contrast to the minimal overshoot that may result from the design of the lowest ScenarioMIP 664 emissions pathway discussed in detail in the last section. 665 666 There are several considerations in how an overshoot scenario may be designed: 667 In order to compensate for the high level of overshoot, this pathway will need to achieve 668 higher CDR levels than the very low ScenarioMIP pathway. Hence, sustainability 669 considerations will likely have to be relaxed compared to the very low pathway. Despite 670 the difficulty in assessing future CDR technologies, however, the attempted use of CDR 671 should still be within the assessed plausible range in the literature. 672 -The scenario needs to be sufficiently different from other scenarios in ScenarioMIP, in 673 terms of resolving differences between ESM runs. Differences are measured not only in 674 terms of IAM estimated temperature and concentration pathways, but also in terms of 675 CDR measures implemented (volume and type) (leading possibly also to additional 676 impacts). 677 -The scenario needs to be relevant in the context of the Paris Agreement. 678 679 Other specific elements to be considered in design of overshoot scenarios include: 680 Start time/approximate Global Mean Surface Temperature/Global Surface Air 681 Temperature (GMST/GSAT) level when net-negative emissions are initially realised. 682 Attempted rate of net-negative emissions and plausible maximum rate. 683 End target GMST/GSAT level and net-negative emissions in the long-term (King et al., -684 2022). 685 Composition of continuing greenhouse gas emissions (proportions of CO₂, CH4, etc. 686 with different lifetimes).

- 687 Mode of net-negative emissions and roles of land use change, DAC, etc.
- The overall levels of residual emissions and carbon dioxide removal technologies (e.g.
- high residual emissions with greater CDR or lower residual emissions with less CDR).
- 690 691
- 692 In order to see differences in climate outcomes above the noise of internal variability, separation 693 between the lowest scenario and the overshoot might need to be large enough. For CMIP6, a 694 separation of 0.25-0.3 deg C was proposed (Tebaldi et al., 2015); it might be useful whether lower differentiations might be possible. (McKenna et al., 2021; Pfleiderer et al., 2018) although 695 696 the emission-driven mode might lead to an even larger overlap. We can illustrate the possible 697 design of the scenario with some simple calculation. In terms of CO₂ emissions, the required 698 temperature gap equals about 400-600 GtCO₂, depending on the contribution of SLCFs and 699 non-CO₂ gases to the overshoot (the less rapid reductions of CH4 may contribute up to about 700 0.15 deg C to the peak temperatures). Assuming that the design of the overshoot scenario 701 would be a continuation along the emissions pathway of current policies (likely close to constant 702 emissions), emissions should follow that pathway for a time period sufficiently long enough to 703 create the above mentioned emission wedge. Thereafter, emissions would start dropping 704 rapidly to net zero and then net negative levels to draw down temperatures in the long term. 705 During this last phase, the overshoot scenario would 'catch-up' to the very low scenario. If the 706 maximum CDR rate were around 10 GtCO₂ per year, it would take more than 50 years to catch 707 up (as also the very low scenario might result in negative emissions). 708 709 The extent and duration of the overshoot will depend on the difference of CO₂ and non-CO₂ 710 emissions between the scenarios. The mechanisms and extent of attempted CDR deployment 711 will have ESM-specific efficacies which will impact the degree to which the attempted high 712 overshoot is realized in some members of the ESM ensemble. This may cause larger 713 intermodel uncertainty for the LOS scenario than for other scenarios of the ScenarioMIP set. 714 715 It might be desirable to consider dimensions additional to peak warming to differentiate the very 716 low emission scenario from the overshoot scenario. These dimensions may include among 717 other factors: 718 Different SLCF trajectories and in particular methane that has been identified as a key • 719 lever for the very low scenario above. Different assumptions about land futures and respective emissions as well as land cover 720 • changes. The very low pathway may be linked to a sustainable land future in line with 721 722 the SDG narrative including reduced pressure from agricultural land and considering 723 environmental constraints. The high overshoot scenario could contrast that - in line with 724 a need for very large scale and rapid upscaling of CDR needs in such a scenario. 725 Strongly differentiated land futures can lead to noticeable biophysical (local and 726 nonlocal) and carbon cycle effects. At the same time, introducing too many differences 727 would limit the capability to interpret the differences in terms of overshoot; that is, the 728 ability to assign differences in climate outcomes to the occurrence of overshoot. As the 729 scenarios are mostly interpreted in terms of overshoot, it is proposed to be careful about 730 adding additional design criteria - but only look into the additional demand for CDR in 731 the overshoot scenario (in the second half of the century). 732

- As discussed previously, it is important for these scenarios to follow a plausible emissions pathway to 2030 so as to not be non-actionable counterfactuals.
- 735
- ScenarioMIP will discuss with LUMIP whether runs can be done with alternative land usepatterns.
- 738

739 4.4 Design of the low emissions scenario

- The third scenario in the low category is a scenario aimed at staying well-below 1.5 °C,
- comparable to the C3 category of IPCC (and is thus also relevant for discussions on the Paris
- Agreement). This scenario will have a slower emission reduction trajectory than the very low
- scenario. In 2030, emissions might be similar to the current emission pledges. After that,
- emissions are projected to be reduced further and reach net-zero CO_2 emissions around 2070.
- Before 2070, some CDR use might compensate for hard-to-abate emission sectors. After 2070,
- a decision can be made about how long and how deep emissions will remain negative. One
- needs to consider the overshoot character of this scenario versus the very low scenario with
 overshoot case (LOS) in order to increase the expected difference in climate outcomes from
- r40 overshoot case (LOS) in order to increase the expected difference in climate outcom 749 climate model runs.
- 750
- 751
- 752 4.5 Summary
- 753 IAM teams are asked to explore the following scenarios as indicated in Table 4.1.
- 754
- 755 Table 4.1: Main characteristics of the scenarios

	Description
L	Scenario that has the characteristics of the C3 scenario in IPCC WGIII; reaching net-zero CO_2 around 2070. Emissions in 2030 at the level of current pledges.
VL	Very low scenario, relevant for the low end of the Paris temperature range staying as close as possible to 1.5 deg C. The scenario will explore near-term methane reduction. The scenario most likely reaches net-zero emissions around the middle of the century.
LOS	Emission reduction is constrained to current policies in 2030 and remains relatively high for some period of time (leading to overshoot). After that mitigation policies kick-in rapidly. CDR use in the second half of the century draws down temperature.

756

5. Scenario extensions beyond 2100/2125

759

During the ScenarioMIP meeting in Reading, the desire to consider a set of scenario extensions
 going beyond the 21st century was expressed. The purpose of these extensions is twofold. For
 the high and medium emission scenarios the extensions will explore the long-term Earth
 System response to high level of warming, including the risk of breaching tipping points and

- triggering large scale irreversible changes. For the low, very low and very low overshoot
- scenarios, the extension will aim to explore the long-term commitment and potential reversibility,

possibly to pre-industrial levels, of the anthropogenic perturbation.

767





769 Figure 5.1. Preliminary extensions for ScenarioMIP in CMIP7. Top middle and bottom plots

show total GHG emissions using AR6 GWP100 estimates, cumulative CO₂ emissions and

global mean temperature respectively. Temperatures are calculated using the probabilistic AR6

ensemble of the FaIR simple climate model, with shaded area representing the 5-95%percentiles.

Table 5.1: Main characteristics of the scenario extensions776

	н	HOS	М	MOS	L	VL	LOS
Tier	High priority	Medium Priority	Low priority	Medium Priority	Low priority	High priority	Low priority
Purpose	Assessment of risk of large irreversible changes in slow components of the Earth system	Assessment of reversibility from a very high warming state	Assessment of long-term implications of current policy, including large overshoot and reversibility	Assessment of potential to meet Paris targets on a multi-century timescale from a current policy scenario	Assessment of long-term commitment under strong mitigation	Assessment of long-term commitment under highest mitigation	Assessment of reversibility, including climate restoration
Storyline	Constant CO ₂ emissions from 2125 to 2175, linear reduction reaching net zero CO ₂ by 2275 and zero CO ₂ emissions thereafter	Radical emissions reductions after 2125 to negative CO ₂ emissions after 2200	Emission reduction to net-zero CO ₂ by 2200	Emission reduction in 2125, zero CO ₂ by 2175, to strongly negative in 2200 and thereafter.	Emissions reaches net- zero CO ₂ around 2200, followed by zero CO ₂ emissions until 2300	Return from net-negative to net-zero CO ₂ emissions around 2275, followed by zero CO ₂ emissions	Continue negative CO ₂ emissions, returning to preindustrial forcing by 2300

777

As has been the case under the CMIP6 ScenarioMIP design, the scenario extensions will

- consist of emission and concentration trajectories to 2300 that are idealized, rather than being
- the outcome of IAM model simulations. While IAMs are useful in generating plausible evolution
- of greenhouse gas emissions in the shorter-term, beyond about a century's time the
- 782 uncertainties that increasingly affect the socio-economic drivers of these trajectories end up
- 783 limiting the usefulness of IAMs for scenario design. Forcings will be harmonised to the end year
- of the IAM scenarios (2100 or 2125) and will then follow stylized trajectories with a coherent
- narrative (e.g., constant positive CO_2 emissions, zero or negative CO_2 emissions, declining CO_2
- emissions, with additional simplified assumptions about non- CO_2 forcing, land cover change,
- etc.). The idealized nature of these extensions also means that the current proposal can be
- easily adapted to further input or rationales, not requiring the same time commitment by the IAM
- groups as the 21st century scenarios described in the previous sections.
- 790

The rationale and proposed GHG emissions (or concentration) trajectories for the extensions of the main scenarios (Figure 2.1) are described here, and summarised in Table 5.1. The proposal is to have the extensions of the high and the very low scenarios as high priority, and the

- extensions of the medium, low and very low overshoot scenarios as low priority, with the
- extensions for the high and medium overshoot given medium priority.
- 796
- 797 The long-term extensions are designed to achieve temperature stabilization post-2300. This
- stabilization is assessed here using an ensemble of the FaIR simple climate model, but in
- practice involves achievement of net zero CO_2 (rather than net zero GHG), given that on multi-
- 800 centennial timescales, non-CO₂ forcing stabilises at constant emissions levels.
- 801

802 5.1a High scenario (H) - high priority

803 It is proposed to have two extensions for the high scenario. The highest extension will explore 804 the risk of long-term changes in slow components of the Earth system, also helping to assess 805 the linearity of the transient climate response to cumulative emissions (TCRE) under high level 806 of CO_2 emissions. It will keep emissions constant at their 2125 level until 2175, then emissions 807 would follow a moderate linear reduction, reaching net zero CO_2 by 2275. The scenario would 808 be ensured that total cumulative emission will be within the known fossil resources (Rogner, 809 1997).

- 810
- 811

812 5.1b High overshoot scenario (HOS) – medium priority

- The high overshoot scenario extension will explore the risk of irreversibility/hysteresis in slow components of the Earth system (e.g., ice sheets) beyond 2125. It will also help to assess the
- 815 linearity of (TCRE) under high level of negative CO₂ emissions. The scenario will adopt a strong
- 816 linear emissions reduction from 2125 onward, starting from the 2125 emissions level, achieving
- $zero CO_2$ emissions by 2200 and negative CO_2 emissions post 2200. The long-term
- 818 temperature objectives would be to reach the warming levels of the Medium Scenario in the819 2300s.
- 820
- 821 5.2a Medium scenario (M) low priority
- 822 The medium scenario extension will assess the long-term implications of current policy,
- addressing the potential for a high-overshoot scenario to reverse the 21st century warming from
- 824 current policies. The medium scenario would be extended beyond 2125 with strong linear
- emissions reduction, reaching net zero CO_2 by 2200, followed by net zero CO_2 until 2300.
- 826
- 827 5.2b Medium overshoot scenario (MOS) medium priority
- 828 The medium overshoot scenario will explore the potential to meet Paris targets on a multi-
- 829 century timescale from a current policy scenario. Strong emissions reductions will begin in 2125
- to zero CO_2 around 2175 and strongly negative in 2200. Emissions will remain negative for
- 831 ~150 years to bring cumulative emissions down to a level consistent with returning
- temperatures to around the levels of the L scenario in the 24th century.
- 833

834 5.3 Low scenario (L) - low priority

The low scenario extension will serve the purpose of assessing the long-term climate and Earth

system commitments under what is seen as a realistic, strong, 21st century mitigation scenario.

837 The low scenario extension would first bring emissions from their anticipated negative 2125

838 level to net zero CO_2 around 2200, followed by net zero CO_2 until 2300. The design would be for

- 839 long-term warming to stabilize at around 1.5-2°C above preindustrial level.
- 840 5.4 Very low scenario (VL) high priority

Similarly to the low scenario extension, the very low scenario extension will explore the longterm climate commitment of the anthropogenic perturbation following the most ambitious 21st century mitigation scenario. Starting from the negative emissions level achieved in 2125, the very low scenario extension would linearly return to net zero CO₂ by 2275, followed by net zero CO₂ until 2300. The design would be for long-term warming to stabilize at around 1°C above 1850-1900 levels.

847

848 5.5 Very low with overshoot (LOS) - low priority

The very low with overshoot scenario extension support an assessment of complete reversibility under overshoot, including exploring the potential for climate restoration, i.e. aiming to returning

near pre-industrial conditions by 2300. The extension would keep a level of negative CO₂

emission from 2125 until 2300, necessary to bring the 2300 anthropogenic forcing near the preindustrial level. The design would be for long-term warming to stabilize at the 1850-1900

854

levels.

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As for the 21st century scenarios in ScenarioMIP, emission driven simulations are favoured for
 the extensions, with prescribed CO₂ emissions, prescribed land cover change, and prescribed
 non-CO₂ concentrations. The specific of the extensions of non-CO₂ forcings, land use cover and

860 CDR (see Section 6) will be finalised once the IAM-produced scenarios are developed up to

2125, the rationale being to have the forcings of the extensions harmonised to the 2125 values,

862 with a 2125-2300 evolution consistent with the overall storyline of the scenario extension, noting

that non-CO₂ emissions will probably remain positive for most extensions (see Figure 5.1).

6. Representation of carbon dioxide removal

865 Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods are an important component of climate mitigation plans and have a unique role in reducing emissions via their potential to enable net-negative 866 867 emissions. How these methods are deployed will affect both land use and land management, as 868 well as energy system compositions, impacting broader sustainable development and biodiversity considerations (Mace et al., 2021). Currently, a broad range of CDR methods are 869 870 being discussed within the policy communities and considered as part of climate action plans, 871 however IAMs only represent a subset of these approaches. The main CDR methods 872 represented in IAMs are Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Direct Air 873 Capture and Storage (DACCS), and afforestation. In addition, IAMs are exploring new CDR 874 methods such as biochar, soil carbon sequestration, enhanced weathering, and ocean-based 875 CDR, although these are not likely to be included in scenarios for ScenarioMIP as part of 876 CMIP7. These methods will be investigated in ScenarioMIP future scenarios, as well as within 877 other related MIPs such as CDR-MIP, LUMIP, and geoMIP. The CDR methods used in these 878 scenarios are intended to be plausible but do represent a wide range of uncertainty and 879 assumptions about underlying drivers (e.g. socio-economic and technological conditions). 880 An important need across this modeling process is for as much consistency as possible

881 between models (from IAMs to harmonization to use within ESMs) for areas of land-use change 882 as well as emissions and reductions resulting from CDR activities. In addition, full transparency 883 and clarity about which processes are included in models (and the related intentions and 884 considerations of IAMs), the steps involved in translating this information between models, and 885 how this gets implemented in ESMs needs to be recorded to provide a clear understanding for 886 the community about how to use ScenarioMIP runs in an impacts model or other studies to 887 understand the impacts and trade-offs of CDR. This includes details on which type of CCS is 888 used, and assumptions about total life-cycle emissions. When possible, underlying information 889 on drivers of land-use change (especially food production vs bioenergy crop production) should 890 also be provided, even if only at regional scales (and can potentially be downscaled either within 891 the harmonization process or within ESMs themselves).

- 892 Of the CDR methods listed above,
- DACCS (and comparable flows) could be directly reported from IAMs to ESMs. The proposal is to report the DACCS flow separately (and harmonize and downscale separately) from total emissions. The total CO₂ emissions would be still reported including DACCS activity.
 There are several components to consider with BECCS:
- 898 o the land-use change associated with increasing or decreasing areas of bioenergy
 899 crops,
- 900 the emissions from bioenergy that replace other emissions in the energy system,901 and
- 902 the emissions removed via carbon capture and storage.

For CMIP7, we suggest that ESM teams run in emissions-driven mode but directly use theprovided BECCS emissions (or resulting concentrations), rather than computing these

- 905 emissions within their own models. Biogenic carbon removed by BECCS will be harmonized
- and downscaled separately from energy related emissions with forcings provided as additional
- 907 gridded data layers. Regional BECCS-related removals will also be harmonized and reported. In
- addition, to relay key information around BECCS to ESMs, IAMs will need to report at the
- 909 gridded level, the land-use change areas associated with first and second-generation bioenergy
- 910 crop deployment. Irrigation and fertilizer usage associated with bioenergy crops will also be
- 911 provided.
- 912 An important goal of ScenarioMIP is for ESMs to be able to compute BECCS-related emissions
- 913 within their own models. However, these experiments are currently best handled as research
- 914 projects or within another MIP for CMIP7. ScenarioMIP calls for continued research on the best
- 915 approaches for IAMs to provide BECCS-related data for use in emission-driven ESMs and for
- 916 ESMs to use that data in a way that is consistent with the original IAM intentions.
- 917 Afforestation for negative emissions will be provided as gridded areas of land-use for new forest
- 918 plantations in previously non-forested locations. This will be reported separately from reforested
- areas and existing forest areas (by both IAMs and ESMs) which will enable support for
- 920 downstream biodiversity and impacts analysis. It is critical for a meaningful representation in
- 921 ESM that they can represent managed forests.

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1038 Appendix A: Acronyms

- 1039 AerChemMIP Aerosol Chemistry Model Intercomparison Project
- 1040 AFOLU Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
- 1041 BECCS Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage
- 1042 CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
- 1043 CMIC Climate Model of Intermediate Complexity
- 1044 CMIP Coupled Model Intercomparison Project
- 1045 CDR Carbon Dioxide Removal
- 1046 DAC Direct Air Capture
- 1047 DACCS Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage
- 1048 DECK Diagnostics, Evaluation and Characterization of Klima
- 1049 ESM Earth System Model
- 1050 EV Electric Vehicle
- 1051 GCM Global Circulation Model/Global Climate Model
- 1052 GHG Green-house gas
- 1053 GMST Global Mean Surface Temperature
- 1054 GSAT Global-mean Surface Air Temperature
- 1055 GWP100 Global Warming Potential over 100 years
- 1056 H High scenario
- 1057 IAM Integrated Assessment Model
- 1058 IAMC Integrated Assessment Modeling Consortium
- 1059 IEA International Energy Agency
- 1060 input4mip CMIP activity tasked with the processing and availability of input data for ESM
- 1061 experiments under CMIP
- 1062 IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
- 1063 L Low Scenario
- 1064 LUMIP Land Use Model Intercomparison Project
- 1065 M Medium Scenario
- 1066 MIP Model Intercomparison Project
- 1067 MOS Medium scenario with Overshoot
- 1068 NDC Nationally Determined Contributions
- 1069 OS Overshoot
- 1070 RAMIP Regional Aerosol Model intercomparison Project
- 1071 RCP Representative Concentration Pathway
- 1072 SCM Simple Climate Model
- 1073 SDG Sustainable Development Goal
- 1074 SLCF Short-Lived Climate Forcer
- 1075 SSC Scientific Steering Committee
- 1076 SSP Shared Socio-economic Pathways
- 1077 TCRE Transient Climate Response to cumulative Emissions

- 1078 VIA Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation
- 1079 VIACCS Vulnerability, Impacts, Adaptation and Climate Services
- 1080 VL Very Low scenario
- 1081 LOS Very Low scenario with Overshoot
- 1082 WGI/II/II Working Group I/II/III
- 1083
- 1084